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THEODOR MERON: Let me start with Justice Goldstone.

were the problems you encountered in the infancy of The H
tribunal, and which you believe have been largely solved?

RICHARD GOLDSTONE: I think the main problem that

been solved relates to the very credibility and justification for s

ting up the Yugoslavia tribunal. When I arrived on Augus
1994, the tribunal had been written off, throughout the de
ratic world and the undemocratic world, especially by
media - and understandably so. Human rights activists h

thrown up their hands in frustration at the political disregar

the victims for whom the tribunal had been set up. I am refe

to the political games that were being played in the Sec

Council, and to a lesser extent in the Secretariat itself. In par
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lar, there was the 15-month delay in

that was a huge problem the tribun
selves had been appointed the previou
been there for some eight months, fe
didly told me. Having fashioned the
dence, they were waiting for trials t
any investigations, even in the assem
and frustration.

That is now a thing of the past. No institution is perfect, and

there certainly have been other serious problems with regard to
the running of both tribunals. However, they are now up and run-

ning and respected and doing important work. The change is a
very significant one.

MERON: May I continue? We are friends, and therefore I can ask

these questions. What do you think was the major mistake you
made as a prosecutor?

GOLDSTONE: Absolutely none. That's an easy one.
MERON: Is there anything you would have done a different way?

GOLDSTONE: I don't think so. I was fortunate in having wonderful advisers and colleagues. From day one I made it a point of
consulting widely, particularly with the NGO community, and
Aryeh Neier in particular was a valued mentor and adviser. They
were not single-person decisions. But they were decisions taken
carefully, because they were difficult decisions. I really can't think

of anything significant that could have been done differently.

MERON: Would you now, with hindsight, indict people like
Dusan Tadic, or wait for more prominent criminals?

GOLDSTONE: In this regard, I must with respect disagree with
something that Judge Wald said yesterday. She spoke about the
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inappropriateness and unhappiness of in

There were two reasons for it, and they
unavoidable. One is unfortunate and one is not. The unfortunate

one was that when I arrived in The Hague, I was informed that I
would have to appear in November, three months after I arrived,
before the budget committee of the United Nations: the Advisory

Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. Knowledgeable UN insiders advised me that the future financing of the
tribunal would depend entirely on whether we were given an ade-

quate budget. And I was advised that if we didn't have an indictment out by November 1994, that would not happen - we would

be without adequate funding. And that was a serious concern.
Obviously I would not have countenanced signing an indictment
if there was not adequate available evidence to justify it. But the
only person against whom, by the beginning of November, we had

evidence that justified an indictment was a man called Nicolic. In
the constellation of war criminals in Bosnia, Nicolic was a small

fish, as the newspapers liked to call him. But, in order for the tri-

bunal to survive, we decided that it was necessary to issue that
indictment.

I have always conceded that Nicolic was a most inappropriate
first indictee of the first international criminal court. It would

have been lovely to start off with an indictment against Bosnian
Serb leader Karadzic or Bosnian Serb General Mladic, or somebody at that level. But at that point of time there just was not even

the beginnings of a case then against them.
We then continued with a number of other small fish. That was

a very deliberate policy. If you examine the Nuremberg record,
you will be surprised - as I was the first time I read it - how little
witness evidence there was. The bulk of the evidence was docu-

mentary. The Nuremberg prosecutors were blessed with smoking
guns galore. They had to weed out which guns to use. The docu-

ments carefully recorded in the hand and above the signature of
many of the accused what they did.
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We had no such gift. At the Yugo

documentary proof; there were no

build up circumstantial cases. The w
there were hundreds of thousands of them, over 300,000 Muslim

refugees in Germany alone - could only give us evidence against
the people who victimized them: camp guards, camp commanders. They didn't know who gave the orders for their victimization.

MERON: They did not know the senior people.
GOLDSTONE: But we had to establish, through a series of lower
level investigations and indictments, that there was a plan. We
could show that over a short period many villages in a swath of
Bosnia were being ethnically cleansed. It was clear that the intention was to join the Serb Republic with Serbia proper. And we
could establish - and this is the case that I hope Karadzic will have
to answer - that orders must have been given for this ethnic
cleansing to have been carried out by these lower level officials in
many villages. We were assisted by the sort of boastful statements
that people like Karadzic made, acknowledging that constitutionally he was not only the head of state but also the commander in
chief of the armed forces of the Serb Republic. And he used to
say, "Nothing happens in my army without my knowing it, and
without my ordering it." But that's the sort of case that had to be

built up. Without the lower level investigations and indictments,
we would not have had the indictment against Karadic.

MERON: Thank you very much. Ken Anderson, you have been a
frequent critic of the tribunals. Could you, in a nutshell, tell us
what was your main complaint about the tribunals?
KENNETH ANDERSON: It's actually a difficult one to articulate
in this company, partly because of the respect that I have for the

people that are on the panel, and partly because the issue is a
deeply emotional one for many people in the audience today.
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MERON: So it's a good question.

ANDERSON: Yes, precisely. And I sho
by becoming a law professor, Ted, th
the questions. So the tables have bee
MERON: I also am a professor.

ANDERSON: Yes, so they have! I have
Golds tone's suggestion that the Yug
the legitimacy and relevance that h

think that's so, but I hesitate to take th

of directions because ultimately I'm n

to discuss here today, which is really
think I should be clear about my posi
standing the heroic and noble work
them, there is enormous myopia abo
macy. I say this while remaining com

thing that Justice Goldstone has

description of how cases are built, an

had to be developed with the NGO co
with international organizations - for
has carried out in actually trying to
court, or that Professor Meron is doin

Nonetheless, the legitimacy that exists

dations of sand. It represents a desp
tain international elites who const
international organizations, their sta

ple in the international NGO worl

between two relatively narrow const
relate all to the larger world. I don't
legitimacy can be had except on the

tions to which the Yugoslavia court

and I don't think that it can have. I thi

even larger for the International Cr
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not institutions that can be created i

ratic legitimacy in some form. Moreo

legitimacy that is accorded from sta

not the kind of legitimacy that can give

ceedings taking place now.
Yet somebody will reply, "But surely
is that we agree that crimes against h
are things that nobody can object to."
But when one moves to an actual court
cedure. Procedure concerning issues s

dence, what motions can be brough
about this thing?

On those concerns there are no s
don't think that there need to be. There are different standards

in different democratic societies, and in different societies gener-

ally. So, the nutshell of my objection, really, is that I think that
these courts lack any kind of foundation for the exercise of the

political power they wield; they lack legitimacy grounded in any
kind of genuinely democratic institutions, and you cannot get
that legitimacy merely by talking about the pooling of sovereign
states and their democratic legitimacy. It just doesn't carry over to
these kinds of institutions and individuals. That said, I'm not sure

we need to go further in that way. I think it's worth laying that

position out, but I think that there are so many other questions
that have also been raised about what should be the substantive

rules of humanitarian law in relation to terrorism, more narrowly
confined, that I don't want to derail the discussion.
MERON: We will reach that too, I can assure you. But I think that,
given your articles criticizing the tribunal, it was good to touch on
these issues, and I'm wondering whether Judge Wald and Aryeh Neier
would like to comment, especially on this question of legitimacy.

PATRICIA WALD: Actually, I had a follow-up question to make
sure I understood Professor Anderson's position, which I hope
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won't draw us too far down the path

centrate on. And that is, understandin
bunal, I find it difficult to understa

you think would provide this kind of

worldwide basis. Would it have to b

the UN - which of course the tribuna

If you have a massive crime agains

options. Either forget about any kin
and concentrate, as many of the sp
did, on some kind of military interv

already been done as, say, Srebrenica

week, go down some path of - I wo
some form of nonjudicial accounta
form of judicial accountability that
legitimacy standards?

MERON: I believe Aryeh also has a co

sor Anderson can reply to both of th

ARYEH NEIER: The only comment I w
courts owe their legitimacy to a num
manner in which they are created,
which they are entrusted. Beyond tha

legitimacy primarily from their perfor

Supreme Court of the United States
acquired legitimacy over a period of
the performance of the Supreme Cou
ratic legitimacy over the past two ce
won't know about the democratic legi
Criminal Court until we see its perfo
tribunals are concerned, I believe t

legitimacy. It is remarkable how m

acquired. There are of course quarrels
in Serbia, because of a perception tha

geted. Even in Serbia, however, there
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the legitimacy of the Yugoslavia tr
complaints about the Rwanda tribun
time, however, even there, greater a
the Rwanda tribunal has occurred. In

degree of acceptance of both the

Yugoslavia tribunal. That says to me

built a level of legitimacy that goes we

row elites that you are talking about

MERON: Thank you very much. Ken

ANDERSON: Let me start with Arye
it's true, the courts build their legit
But I think that if one looks at the
it's simply impossible to divorce its
dedness within a certain kind of democratic, constitutional order.

Its performance within that structure is what gives it legitimacy
within a democratic polity. I just don't think one can divorce the

performance of courts and talk about them having some sort of
free-floating legitimacy in a way that's removed from the political
system of which they are part, or the political community of which

they are part. I just don't understand the nature of the political
community in which international tribunals are supposedly operating. It certainly doesn't look like a democratic polity in any
meaningful sense to me.
Going to Judge Wald's question. It's a very fair question: What
else do you do? Judicial accountability is not fundamentally the
issue; democratic accountability is. I'm not particularly bothered
by it, in the case of the Yugoslavia tribunals. I'm much more bothered by it in the case of the ICC. This is because the Yugoslavia tribunals are much more narrow in what it is they're dealing with.
This ad hoc nature, I think, raises fewer questions about it. But
fundamentally, I don't think judicial solutions are the way to go
with this, and I would far have preferred to see no Yugoslavia tribunals and instead a massive intervention by NATO at the begin-
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ning. (And certainly a very differen

from the beginning.) But again, that

direction. It is a mistake, however, t
achieved on the basis of what is agre
who hang out at the UN, and with p
for it from the Open Society Institut
reach more broadly to achieve demo

right in saying that these tribunals hav

imacy than I would have expected, bu
world out there than the world that

bottom, I don't really understand the

community" in which these things
don't think it can really support a
ability because it does not have, an
legitimacy.

MERON: We will stay with the Intern

the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for an
and then move on to other questions
moment, from Judge Wald in partic
Neier, their thinking about the so-ca
bunal.

Before moving on to that, if I may - as a moderator I'm supposed to be neutral, and I will try to be - let me make a comment
or two about this discussion we've been having about legitimacy
of the ICTY. In the case of the ICC, one of the three prongs or
triggers for the jurisdiction of the ICC has been the referral,
under Chapter VII, from the Security Council. So the international community, the entire international community, felt that
there is some legitimacy in that means, and we all know that in
fact effectiveness of the ICC might require that this might be one

of the first cases - who knows? Referred to the ICC might be a
case that would have to be referred by the Security Council.

And I would like to say something now about this point to
which Aryeh noted: namely, the legitimacy ultimately of every
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court, of every institution, rests on

that in the normative sense, the deve

of international humanitarian la

remarkable. And it would be extrem

such as the ICC to have been eve
able to fall back on those princi
jurisprudence developed by the I

what is particularly surprising, an

ICTY developed an extremely sop
structure. And when I arrived at T
one-half of my time initially was
Perhaps this shows that these tribu
sure that if Judge Wald would talk

ject today, about her experience

would tell us how much of her tim
dural questions.
And in that respect I would like
very important cross-fertilization

For example, last week we revised
locutory appeals, and we had to in
we felt that our own standards in o

as good as the standards included
revising rules for our own needs,
dards for interlocutory appeals,
own rules.

Now, Judge Wald: What do you think about this so-called exit
strategy?

WALD: First let me tell you what I understand the exit strategy to

be. It may be a moving target, it may have changed, since I left
The Hague. But my understanding, while I was there, is that the
tribunal would make every effort to complete its trials by the end
of this decade, with the appeals coming a few years later. And I
think that is a wise strategy, given some flexibility. Obviously you

don't shut the place down if the last trial hasn't been completed.
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But I think it was necessary for sever

practical level. From meetings that I

attended by high UN officials, I think th

because the ICTY is virtually comple
there are voluntary contributions for
had to be an exit strategy. There was
there so that it could go on too mu

plan. But I think, apart from the realpol

to be able to say to the UN, when it a

litem judges to help it speed up the t

have a plan now for finishing up these

The tribunal will, by the time it finish

plan, have been in existence for two d

2013 or 2014. And, as I noted in my pa

ably getting to the edge of permissible

statute of limitation on crimes agai
humanity, but I do think these are

ducting trials and getting those witn

referred to as time passes. These tri
dominant. When you get to two decad

and harder to put together a case of cr

high evidentiary standards that the trib

What I do want to point out, howeve

strategy, and this indeed may be the h
it as I understand it, is where do those

but that the tribunal just can't acco

where do they go? My understanding

plete one, is that many of those will b
"downloaded" - onto the Bosnian court

in the Serb Republic, courts in Croati

future courts in Serbia as well. But th
the Bosnians themselves are only now
plan, as it were: they have tried some

few dozen so far. I think they have to be
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also technical assistance, some sup
that allows the tribunal to do that MERON: 11 bis.

WALD: Thank you - which allows the tribunal to cooperate with
national courts on trials removed from the tribunal. For these

countries to be able to take any significant number of war crime

this will be necessary because these war crimes, based on the care
ful nature in which they have been prosecuted and tried, take
years of field investigation, of body exhumations, all kinds of very

complicated preliminary work that a lot of these country judicia

systems are just not used to doing. And they're going to need con

siderable help in being able to do it properly. They're going to

need witness protection protocols. They have already started

amending their statutes so that they can do it under proper lega
authority. But that's where, in effect, if you want to bring closure

to this episode, this terrible episode of the Bosnian wars, you nee

a combination of what the tribunal will have accomplished by th

time it goes out of existence and some rational plan for picking
up the most important ones left.

We'll never be able to try all the war crimes. The estimate is

and it's just a figure people pull out of the air - 50,000 war crime
created in the course of the Bosnian-Croatian wars. But even with

the crimes we consider the most significant, the national courts
are going to need a lot of assistance in that downloading process.
Croatia has already made some promising starts in trying some
war criminals on its own, but it's that kind of a combination strat-

egy that we'll need. In the end, I do think we need an exit strat-

egy. You can't really have a "temporary" ad hoc court - well, I
guess you could, but I don't think it's what we're all looking
toward: one that just goes on and on and on.
MERON: Thank you very much. I am glad that you touched on
this question of standard and norms and due process in tribunals
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in the former Yugoslavia. There is very

day comes there will be still a number o

bunal at The Hague has not been able to

spective of international humanitarian law
there will be a lot of talk about referring
dictions. And more particularly, courts in

perhaps hybrid courts, mixed court

extremely complex issue, because I do b

tional community would not be satisfied

to jurisdictions that might not as yet mee

I would like to turn now to Aryeh Neie

read your wonderful article in the New Yo

the military tribunals. We are now, nee

the ICTY and Rwanda to more contem
Your article has been extremely critical

regulations that have been issued, and I

very influential in producing various re

guidelines and regulations issued by th
My question to you is: To what extent

meet your concerns - and to what exten

NEIER: Judge Goldstone suggested he m

Hague. I think I did make some mistakes in

Books article about the military tribun
when I was writing the article that the

I focused were only part of the story. S

taken since then to provide some proced
questions that I didn't touch upon were

going to be filed and under which law
Guantánamo Bay going to be tried. Are

violations of the American penal code? A

for violations of international humanita

ent that the United States doesn't yet k

to bring against these people.
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The best guess I have about the c
ally seeing something written by
emerged as a defender of whatever

intends. She seems to suggest that t

spiracy by reason of being affiliated

that is the case, I think there is goin

that can be cited establishing that A
acy. Then one wonders, are they go
membership in a criminal conspirac
sidered in the United States at the
under the Smith Act? Are those sta
in the jurisprudence of the tribuna
the 1 1 top Communists were tried,
were knowing members of the Comm
the forcible overthrow of the United States. That was sufficient for

a conviction. Later on, however, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in various decisions, essentially dismantled the Smith Act.
The Court held that a great deal more had to be shown than just
"knowing membership" in this kind of criminal conspiracy.
Are the Supreme Court's standards going to be met? I think the
whole question of the military tribunal has gotten to be a muddle.

I may have been mistaken in focusing on procedural questions,
such as whether there are going to be appeals to a judicial body;
whether there is going to be a right for the defendants to have
counsel of their own choice. Some of those issues have now been

addressed, but the larger question of what charges are to be
made, and under which body of law they will be tried, seems to
me to remain completely unresolved.
MERON: Thank you very much. In a moment I will turn to Professor Walzer, but one more question to Mr. Neier. Aryeh, you
have always been a strong advocate of the concept of universality

of jurisdiction, and the recognition of the inevitable role of
national courts in prosecuting crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and so on. As you know, there has been a recent decision
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at The Hague - not in my court, but
Justice - in the case of Congo agains

national Court of Justice struck a Belgi

crimes against humanity (it had been

who at the time was the foreign mini

Belgian law is unprecedented in th
universality of jurisdiction, which it

a link to Belgium. Do you think that

gian magistrates have pushed the env

diction a little bit too far, making t

somewhat predictable? How would

magistrate would issue such a warran
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon?

NEIER: I do think the Belgian law does go too far. I think it is one

thing to exercise universal jurisdiction when the defendant is
within the territory of the country. A case that I think was wholly

appropriate took place in Britain a couple of years ago. A man
from Belarus, who was an immigrant to Britain, was charged with
crimes against humanity for his complicity in Nazi war crimes dur-

ing World War II. He lived in Britain for a long period. That was
an appropriate exercise of universal jurisdiction. But for judges in

one country to reach out to defendants who are not within the
territory of that country seems to me inevitably to politicize the
question of universal jurisdiction. Why single out this defendant
and not that defendant? I think that tends to undermine the legitimacy of courts. There has to be a narrower approach to the idea
of universal jurisdiction than we have in Belgium.
One thing I think worth thinking about is whether some effort
should be made to relate universal jurisdiction to the establishment of the International Criminal Court - that is, should it be

necessary for a country to ask a panel of judges of the International Criminal Court for permission to proceed in a particular
case that would tend to regularize the exercise of universal juris-

diction? I don't think universal jurisdiction can be entrusted
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solely to a crusading prosecutor, dec

to reach out to someplace halfway
"This particular person is somebody
court." That is going too far.

MERON: I have Ken who asked, and

ANDERSON: I just wanted to go back
bunals, because I have come out as a s
itary tribunals, although agreeing in
Aryeh's criticisms of the original for
lem, fundamentally, with what's goi
the administration is now discoverin
wrong group of folks there, from an
administration has a group of fighte

folks who probably can't tell them a lo

don't want to send them back into a

again become fighters. I generally a

positions on these issues, but I di
method of going with some kind of

conspiracy theory. International
ample scope for the United States
fighters without charges, at least as

active hostilities going on against A
major argument about how long one
hostilities are over, and when it's no
you'd have to let them go. But I don
simply a matter of "We have to com
that involves essentially creating a s
member of AI Qaeda as such'," or els
Professor Wedgwood is wrong to pus
MERON: Judge Wald?

WALD: Very brief remarks on what
of ICTY and International Criminal T
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jurisprudence, and the problems th

Guantánamo Bay. Apart from our o

been played out in the Smith Act, I'

starting with Nuremberg, and then

bunals, but especially our tribunal,

prise doctrine is a much used doctr

prosecuted pursuant to it, and so a
leaders, but it hasn't been used by t

the high leaders. It's been used, for

in the administration of a prison ca

that is, some of the lower level peo

having a development of the doct
from reading newspaper reports plain newspaper reports - is being

for whatever guidance it can give th

may well see some use by our own

humanitarian law that is being issue

bunal in deciding what to do with

MERON: Thank you, Judge Wald. P

about the unthinkable: nuclear wea

model, we think of nuclear weapon

of a catastrophic attack on the Uni
And in your books you have writ
holding innocent civilians hostage
Now, imagine for a moment that w
AI Qaeda had small nuclear weapo
against New York. Imagine further

defeat AI Qaeda had failed. It was n

operation in Afghanistan would

thought it would be a failure. Imag

still hiding in those remote hideout

the mountains, and that the only
experts tell us they can be attack
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geted, small, relatively "clean" (if t
What would you do?

MICHAEL WALZER: I was sitting he

exempt from all the legal discussion

MERON: We just wanted you to hav

WALZER: I actually have opinions
been asking. But they are uneduc

unlawyerly opinions, and not appro
you've posed: I think I would just re
tainly possible; in fact, our governm
that there are terrorist organization

weapons, but that organizations exist

did get hold of them. And there ar
under certain circumstances, help te

of weapons of this sort. And all of t

wars like the war in Afghanistan,

minded police work against these gr
came to me and told me that the only

to use these weapons ourselves, and t

I would look for other military expe

MERON: I quite agree, but suppose t
you the same thing.

WALZER: My experience of politic

watching politicians, is that they ge

would make sure that I got the ad

There have to be other ways of figh

fighting. We have already engaged
remote and difficult terrain, and if

necessary risks, we can fight succes
nuclear weapons.
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MERON: Ken, do you have commen
with him?

ANDERSON: I agree, in this case. It's a prudential reason, which
is that crossing the nuclear line even with devices that are small
and dig down deep, and all the other characterizations that have

come out in the newspapers, nonetheless does cross that line.
That would be a huge error and a major justification for lots of
other people around the world - probably in India and Pakistan
to start with - to develop and use tactical nukes.
But I think that there's a broader question that goes beyond the
nuclear war question here, which is really the question of preemptive action against people and states that you think may be
acquiring such WMD potentials against you and may be willing to
supply them to others. My view is that preemptive action against
Iraq is both justified and an extremely good idea before its WMD
programs go any further. This goes back to some of Professor
Walzer 's comments in the first session, but I would certainly reiterate that I think that action against Iraq at this point would make
an enormous amount of sense.

MERON: Let us move on to another question: humanitarian
intervention. This can arise in the an ti terrorism context, but pri-

marily of course when there is need to stop atrocities, crimes

against humanity, and so on. And let us relate this to the ICC. This

is a question I would like to ask of all the panelists. Suppose the
Security Council of the United Nations is about to adopt a Chapter VII resolution authorizing an intervention to stop atrocities.
The intervention would then come completely within the legal
concepts of the charter. Of course, the Security Council cannot
order states to contribute forces and to do the job of the military;
this has always been done by countries agreeing to send forces in
harm's way.

Now, imagine for a moment that the success of the operation
would be dependent on the United States because of its logistics,
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its air force. It is the only power tha

put and end to atrocities. Now, imag

from the Pentagon have persuaded

White House told the secretary gene

the members of the Security Counc
vene, provided that the same Chapte
members of the armed forces of th

exemption from ICC jurisdiction for

ted during the operation. If you do
operation, and at least for a short t
time, hundreds of thousands of peop
What do you do? Let me start with

WALZER: This question goes to the p

ism and unilateralism. Your hypot
argument that I have heard often
America's apparent preference for

ment goes this way (it's not presente

amounts to): the Europeans say th

made about whether a particular wa

want to be full partners, as they wou

discussions that you describe. But on

particular war is in fact just and nec

States to fight it, or to do 95 percent o

course, they want American soldiers

crimes from which their soldiers

they're legally exempt, but because t
fighting.

Now, I believe that the United States should join and support
the ICC, but that argument doesn't seem to me either politically
or morally tenable. At the same time, American unilateralism isn't
tenable either - and not primarily because of our unilateral deci-

sions to engage in humanitarian interventions, but (if you've
been listening to these panels) because of our unilateral decisions
not to do so. Yes, we need some kind of multilateral decision-mak-
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ing, but if there's to be multilateralism

be multilateralism later on also, when th
has to be a real and substantial division of labor in the field. And

that means that European states have to invest the money necessary to make it possible for them to join us in a division of labor
on the battlefield. I was amazed to hear that the German soldiers

who went to Afghanistan, not to fight, but to help after the fight-

ing, flew to Afghanistan on rented Russian planes. The Germans
have a rapid deployment force, but they do not have the means to
deploy it, because they haven't appropriated the money to buy or
build the cargo planes and the transport planes. Isn't there something to worry about there - if you believe in multilateralism?
MERON: Let us assume that in the case that we discussed there

would be European participation, but it would not be significant
enough to do the job. And the United States says, "We want this
condition, or we don't play the game."

NEIER: The intervention in Kosovo was by NATO. Therefore i
was a multilateral intervention. In fact, the Pentagon was
extremely unhappy with the restrictions that it felt were imposed,

because the intervention was imposed by NATO.
You will recall that after September 11, NATO for the first time
invoked Article 5 of its charter, saying that an attack on one is an
attack on all. NATO presented itself as ready to undertake the war
in Afghanistan. Given our experience with a multilateral war in
Kosovo, the United States essentially rejected that resolution by
NATO. I believe NATO is now in decline because the United

States has indicated that it did not want NATO to play suc

Hence, it is not altogether fair to suggest that other cou
aren't willing to bear a burden when we rejected a multi
effort in Afghanistan. Moreover, one should consider som
circumstances. The United States has been enthusiastic about the
establishment of an African force to intervene in conflicts in

Africa. In that circumstance we have expressed a willingness to
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provide logistical help to the Africa

and so forth. It would only be Afr

engage in the combat in Africa, ho

MERON: Justice Goldstone?

GOLDSTONE: I don't believe that a

States has any political right to exp

States become militarily involved

States, if it does not wish to do so. A

to intervene in Europe, or Asia, or A

whatever conditions it likes. If the

involved, and if they're not met,
involved. And clearly United States

when they're going to get involved a
But having said that, I don't believe

going to or should accept as one
United States is above the law and can act as an outlaw. If the

United States gets involved it must be subject to the same laws a
the rest of the international community. That is international

humanitarian law. And that sort of exceptionalism has bee
rejected and will continue to be rejected, I have no doubt, b
America's closest allies and friends in Europe and in other
democracies because it is simply not acceptable.
MERON: Thank you, Richard. Ken, on the same point?

ANDERSON: First, on United States exceptionalism. On that,
agree with everything Justice Goldstone said, up to the point
applying the same standards. It's not a question of applying th
same standards; it's a question of who's going to make the judg
ments about them and how they apply to individual cases an
individual people. The United States is saying we have a system
for determining that, which is not going to be the ICC. If tho
are the conditions, then those are the conditions.
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GOLDSTONE: They are having trouble
tem is.

ANDERSON: Hays Parks will disagree with you on that. But let's
go back to the question of what you have with a multilateral force.

Europe does not have a lot at this point in terms of airlift operations to faraway places. I don't think Aryeh's right in describing

that as being merely a function of the United States turning it
down. The French and the Germans and the rest of NATO, with

the exception of the British, didn't have aircraft that were capable
of landing at night in the way that the American aircraft could on

the airfields in Afghanistan. It's just operationally not going to
work. On the other hand, while proudly representing myself as an

American unilateralist, I do want to press Professor Walzer a little
bit on this question of who's going to do the fighting. The fact is,

the United States does need allies - and I say this as an unabashed

unilateralist - precisely because in places like Afghanistan we
expect to go in and do the fighting and then we really do expect

somebody else to come in and maintain the peace. So there is a
question about who is going to put themselves in harm's way if
you agree, as I think is clearly true in Afghanistan, and very true
in almost all peacekeeping situations, that the most dangerous
work very often turns out to be on the shoulders of the people
who maintain the peace after wars. And I say this as an American
unilateralist. I'm not fond of Europe's positions on any of these
things. But we Americans are presuming that the Europeans will

come in to clean things up. That's dangerous work and does
change the equation somewhat from how Professor Walzer represented it. So if I could press you a little bit, Michael, about that.
Does that change how you would think of it?
WALZER: Well, I would prefer a full division of labor. I think they

should share in the fighting and we should share in the peacekeeping. I understand that the Pentagon would prefer to be in
complete charge of its military operations. I wasn't speaking for
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the Pentagon. There are good moral a
fer multilateral peacemaking and p
only to look at the military budget
know that they don't have a strong

those. They are more prepared for

open question whether they will be p

is necessary in the course of any giv
Their record on that is not very goo
States should not be exempt from
seems obvious that when there is full

war, in peacemaking and peacekeepin
diers in the field who are liable to be
will be much easier to make the case
across the board.

MERON: Thank you so much, Professor Walzer. Aryeh, how effec-

tive do you think the ICC is likely to be when it comes to prosecution of crimes of terrorism? You do recall that crimes against

humanity provision does provide the normative NEIER: The International Criminal Court will only be able to deal
with terrorism if terrorism is committed on the very large scale

contemplated by the concept of crimes against humanity. I would

imagine that most terrorism is not going to resemble what hap-

pened on September 11; most terrorism is going to involve
smaller scale crimes. Therefore, the crimes would not fit into the

mandate of the ICC. There is also the question of where the

crimes will be committed. If they are committed on the territory
of states that have not ratified the treaty, unless there were a ref-

erence by the Security Council, the ICC would not have jurisdiction. Accordingly, I anticipate that the ICC will have a very limited

role in dealing with terrorism. It may be that long in the future,
when many more states have ratified the treaty for the ICC, it will

be able to play a larger role. In the foreseeable future, however, I
doubt it will be a significant factor.
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MERON: Richard, would you speculate ab

case, the first case that may come up be

GOLDSTONE: That is a crucially impor
that the future success and credibility
depend very much on where it gets inv

Obviously my first wish is that it should

there are no war crimes committed. Bu
mistic, and certainly would not be what t
eth century should have taught us. So I t
war crimes are going to continue to be

world. The issue is where the ICC is go

hope is that in its early years it will receiv

from the Security Council, and that cou

Assuming hypothetically that there wa
launched by Iraq on Iran and serious war

in that situation I would not anticipate t

reference by the Security Council for t
prosecute such a crime. It would be in th
United States for that to happen. There
lic support for it and the United States,

well take the lead. It would not be inconsist

the ICC - having the Security Council act

other hand, if the ICC, because of the part

the Rome Treaty, were to get involved in t

happening in the Middle East, I think the

tion from the United States, and possib
countries. And one can't ignore the rele
happenstances on the future credibility o

MERON: Thank you so much. Aryeh, yo
on that.

NEIER: Something very interesting took place two weeks ago when
the ICC was ratified. One of the 10 countries that ratified on April
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1 1 was the Democratic Republic of the

ment of ratification. That was accep
thought it was immensely interestin

invaded by several other African count

primarily for the purpose of contro

resources in the particular parts of C

looting those resources. The governm

capacity to get them to remove their t

for the ICC, Congo has now given th

their troops. If they don't do so by Jul

war crimes as they have committed

tries - and they include Rwanda, Uga

Angola - could face prosecution befor

Something similar is occurring in ano

ernment lacks its own capacity to de

President Andres Pastrana, whose term
secure ratification of the treaty before

then the guerrilla forces, the FARC, an

militias that have been committing gre

the possibility of indictment by the

did not anticipate. Governments tha

dealing with terrible crimes that are co

turning to the ICC. If I were the prose

be sure that Congo would be at the top
at. And if Colombia also ratifies, it wou
MERON: Professor Walzer?

WALZER: That's a very interesting suggestion, but I would think

it potentially disastrous. Suppose such a case were brought, and
suppose that the Congolese government won the case against the
various intervening states, and that there was an ICC condemnation of Rwanda, say, or Angola. What happens next? Assuming, as
I would assume, that nothing happens next, wouldn't that be a
terrible defeat for the court?
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NEIER: That raises the larger question
Criminal Court is able to enforce its indictments. The court will

only be able to try those it apprehends. So it would have to apprehend defendants in order to conduct trials. This was a terrible

problem for the Yugoslavia court when it began. Over time, how-

ever, the pressure built up. It became necessary for governments
to turn over those who were indicted and for international forces

to apprehend those who were indicted. Also, in the case of the

Yugoslavia tribunal, even when it was not clear how it would
apprehend people like Karadzic and Mladic, there was great value
in bringing the indictments against them. It delegitimized them.
It excluded them from the Dayton peace talks. It excluded them
from exercising political influence in Bosnia after the end of the
war. Governments in Angola, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Uganda
are not eager to be indicted by the International Criminal Court.
I believe this will make them fearful. It could be a factor, even

before the jurisdiction of the court kicks in, in persuading them

to withdraw their forces from Congo. If they do not withdraw
their forces, or at least rein in their forces, and prevent them from

committing the crimes that would be subject to the jurisdiction of
the ICC, they would face prosecution. I think this is an extremely

positive development. We were being told at one point that the
ICC might prevent various peace settlements because dictators
would have no incentive to give up authority for fear of prosecution. Now we are seeing that the ICC might effectively contribute
to peace.

GOLDSTONE: If I can just add, in support of what Aryeh says, in
the very early days of the Rwanda tribunal I announced the identity of some of the people we were looking for, and some were in
Kenya. And the president of Kenya immediately said that if we sent
our investigators into his country they would be arrested, and that
he was not prepared to extradite, to transfer any people wanted by

the tribunal to Arusha. Fortunately, the president of the Organization of African Unity agreed to make a public statement con-
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demning that attitude. The preside
made an appropriate statement, sayin
ceptable and a breach of the Security

ing under that pressure the attitude

changed within a week. And we got t

investigators. And the transfer of ind
MERON: We have seen that there are two visions of the first case

that will come up. Either referenced by the Security Council,
under Chapter VII, somewhat using the model of the ad hoc tribunals but also using the new structure, and the new judges, and

the new prosecutor of the ICC. And the second is, because states
might be involved in various not terribly pretty things, they have

become parties to the statute.

Remarks

Richard J. Goldstone

During the first years of their existence the two United Nations

ad hoc criminal tribunals - for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, respectively - suffered a substantial lack of credibility.
There was a perception that the Western powers had set them up

to mollify human rights activists at home who were concerned
that no effective steps had been taken to prevent some of the
worst human rights violations since World War II. That was followed by bureaucratic inertia, which substantially delayed the tri-

bunals from becoming operational.
This disappointing start for the first international war crimes

tribunals changed for the better when investigations began in
earnest and indictments were issued. Arrest warrants followed
and arrests were made. Criticism was then directed to the com-

paratively small number of people arrested to appear before the
Yugoslavia tribunal. The Rwanda tribunal was more successful in
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having larger number of defendants
the seat of the tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania.

The Yugoslavia tribunal had no option but to begin with the
smaller number of war criminals with whom the available victims

and witnesses came into contact. There were no "smoking guns"
left by the leaders who were most guilty and circumstantial cases

had to be developed against them. This was accomplished by
establishing a pattern of war crimes over an area of Bosnia, which

was politically valuable to the Bosnian Serb administration of
Radovan Karadzic and his military chief, Ratko Mladic.

When, in July and November 1995, indictments, which
included charges of genocide, were issued against both Karadzic
and Mladic, the problem was the unwillingness or inability of
United Nations (and later NATO) troops to arrest those leaders.
This problem still persists, notwithstanding recent unsuccessful
attempts to make such arrests. Then, in the wake of ethnic cleans-

ing in Kosovo, the president of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, was indicted for crimes against
humanity and other war crimes. Not long after, he was forced
from power and was surrendered by his successors for trial at The

Hague. New indictments followed for genocide allegedly committed by the Serb army in Bosnia and Croatia. The trial continues and is expected to last at least until the end of 2003.

In Arusha, the Rwanda tribunal has placed former leaders on
trial. The former prime minister of Rwanda was found guilty of
genocide and has been sentenced to life imprisonment. That tri-

bunal has also held that systematic mass rape, in the circumstances established by the prosecutor, amounted to genocide.

The two tribunals have been responsible for significant
advances in humanitarian law in a number of important areas.
They have demonstrated that if law is implemented, it advances:
if it is ignored, it stagnates. This and other successes of the two
United Nations tribunals encouraged and hastened the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Regrettably, the
United States, who was initially its most important supporter, has
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become its most significant opponen
Rome Treaty establishing the ICC no

and will be functional in 2003. The s
on the nature of the cases it will con
assumes jurisdiction for significant
and prosecutes them professionally
credibility and attract support form
Security Council itself might well ca
powers rather than choosing to estab
There can be no doubt that the ICC will have much to learn
from the successes and failures of the two United Nations tri-

bunals. Its credibility will be crucial to its success. Upon that credibility will depend its funding at an adequate level and the extent

to which governments will be prepared to comply with its orders
There can be no doubt that its success will herald the end of

impunity for war criminals.
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